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SYSTEM-THEORETIC REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION FOR
HUMAN INTERACTIONS ON FUTURE ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT
Sam M. Yoo, Andrew N. Kopeikin, Dro J. Gregorian, Adam T. Munekata,
John P. Thomas, Nancy G. Leveson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA
Future rotary-wing aircraft designs are highly complex, optionally manned, and
include advanced teaming concepts that create unknown human-automation
interaction safety risks. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) enables
analysis of hazards on these complex systems. This paper demonstrates how to
apply STPA in future helicopters' early concept development to prevent
unacceptable losses. The system is modeled as a hierarchical control structure to
capture interactions between components, including human and software
controllers. Unsafe control actions are identified from these relationships and are
used to systematically derive causal scenarios that arise from both hazardous
interactions between system components and component failures. System
requirements are then generated to mitigate these scenarios. A subset of the
scenarios and requirements that address human factors related concerns are
highlighted. Early identification of these problems helps designers (1) refine the
concept of operations and control responsibilities and (2) effectively design safety
into the system.
Future Rotary-Wing Aircraft (RWA) concepts are highly complex and include
technologies such as autonomous flight, optionally manned capability, and cooperative teaming
with other Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Some of the challenges related to developing
concrete user requirements for future RWA are well documented in recent literature (Sushereba
et al., 2019). The technological complexity that supports future capabilities creates
vulnerabilities for unsafe interactions between system controllers, especially in environments
where operators perform under stress, high workloads, and face conflicting control authority over
systems. A hazard analysis method is required to systematically identify these potential issues
early in development so that mitigations can be designed into the system to enforce safety.
The SAE International Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 outlines methods
for conducting safety assessments on civil airborne systems, such as the Functional Hazard
Assessment (FHA) (SAE, 1996). However, a recent UH-60MU helicopter hazard analysis found
that FHA limited its hazards to component failures and omitted humans from the study, except in
instances where humans were assumed to mitigate the effects of some failures (Albrecht et al.,
2016). Additionally, specific hazards such as "loss of altitude indication in a degraded visual
environment" or "loss of internal/external communications" were categorized as marginal in
severity. In some cases, these hazards can be far more severe. For example, lost communications
were cited as a significant contributor in the 1994 friendly shootdown of two US Army
helicopters (Leveson, 2012). Other traditional hazard analysis techniques such as Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) or Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) also emphasize failures
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(Wasson, 2016). These methods are difficult to apply at the system level and are not
recommended for complex human causality analysis (Cabosky, 2020).
The System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a relatively new hazard analysis
approach that is well suited to effectively handle complex systems like future RWA (Leveson
and Thomas, 2018). Unlike traditional hazard analyses, STPA considers interactions between
system entities, including software and human controllers. The top-down process begins at a
high-level of abstraction and is then refined by iteratively adding design detail. This higher view
enables STPA to provide early insights, even at the conceptual design stage, into potential causes
of losses not typically discovered until much later in the engineering lifecycle. The results
provide a critical opportunity to design safety features in early system development. This paper
explains how STPA can be applied to future RWA to provide a top-down approach to hazard
analysis. The subset of causal scenarios derived through the analysis highlights some of the
human factors related challenges that need to be addressed in the program. The causal scenarios
and requirements discussed in this paper represent a small portion of the completed STPA on
future RWA.
STPA Applied to Future Rotary Wing Aircraft
STPA defines safety as a control problem rather than a component failure problem. The
goal is to identify and design controls that enforce safety constraints uncovered through the
analysis. The process systematically follows four steps described in the following subsections.
The process can be used to rigorously derive design requirements that ensure the system
behavior is safe and that the requirements are end-to-end traceable to the hazards they mitigate.
STPA Step 1: Define the Purpose of the Analysis
The STPA process begins by identifying the system losses unacceptable to the
stakeholders (Leveson and Thomas, 2018). Safety is defined as the absence of such losses. In
future RWA systems, unacceptable losses include (L-1) loss of life or permanent disabling
injury, (L-2) loss or damage to aircraft or equipment, and (L-3) loss of mission. Next, the
analysis identifies the system hazards. These are system states that will lead to a loss under a
particular set of worst-case environmental conditions (Leveson and Thomas, 2018). Table 1 lists
some of the hazards identified for the aircraft and traces each of them to the loss(es) they can
lead to. High-level system safety constraints (SC) can be developed to address each of these
hazards. For example, SC-1 can be derived as follows with traceability to H-1: SC-1 the aircraft
must remain controllable during all manned/unmanned operations [H-1]. Many more traceable
safety constraints with increasing details will be derived as the analysis unfolds.
STPA Step 2: Model the Control Structure
The next step of STPA is to model the hierarchal control structure. The model comprises
feedback control loops and captures the relationships between various controllers and processes
within the system (Leveson and Thomas, 2018). An effective control structure will enforce
constraints on the behavior of the overall system. Each feedback control loop typically consists
of five elements: controllers (in Figure 1, boxes at the top of each loop), control actions (down
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arrows), feedback (up arrows), other inputs/outputs from components (side arrows), and
controlled processes (boxes at the bottom of each loop). Generally, the control structure starts at
an abstract level and is iteratively refined to incorporate more system details. For example, the
Operator(s) element might be refined into manned, remote, and autonomous configurations.
Table 1. Future rotary-wing aircraft system hazards.
Hazard ID
H-1
H-2
H-3
H-4
H-5

Hazard Description
Aircraft is uncontrollable (manned/unmanned)
Structural integrity of aircraft is violated
Minimum aircraft separation standards are violated
Aircraft environment is harmful to human health
Aircraft is unable to conduct mission tasks

Loss Link
L-1, L-2, L-3
L-1, L-2, L-3
L-1, L-2, L-3
L-1
L-1, L-2, L-3

STPA Step 3: Identify Unsafe Control Actions
The third step of STPA is to identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). A UCA is a
control action that will lead to a hazard in a particular context and worst-case environment
(Leveson and Thomas, 2018). Each UCA consists of four parts: (1) the controller issuing the
control action, (2) the type of control action, (3) the control action itself, and (4) the context
under which it becomes hazardous (see Table 2). Each controller and control action in the control
structure is considered. For each control action, there are four types of ways that each need to be
considered on how a control action could cause a hazard: (1) not providing it, (2) providing it
(incorrectly or in the wrong context), (3) providing it too early, too late, or out of order, and (4)
providing for too long or short a time. Table 2 illustrates how a subset of the UCAs are
developed for future RWA and how traceability is maintained to the hazards they cause.
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Figure 1. Safety Control Structure of the Future Rotary-Wing Aircraft System.
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Table 2. Subset of UCAs for the "Flight Control Inputs" operator control action.
UCA Type
Not Providing

UCA
[UCA-1] Operator does not provide flight
control inputs when needed during high power
maneuvers (e.g., takeoff, formation, hover, …)

Hazard Traceability
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-5

Providing

[UCA-2] Operator provides flight control inputs
when aircraft is in autonomous operation

H-1, H-2, H-3, H-5

Too Early / Late /
Wrong Order

[UCA 3] Operator provides flight control inputs
too early before the autonomous mode is
disengaged
[UCA-4] Operator provides flight control inputs
for too long during high power maneuvers

H-1, H-2, H-3, H-5

Applied too long /
Stopped too short

H-1, H-2, H-3, H-5

STPA Step 4: Identify Causal Scenarios
The final step in STPA is to identify causal scenarios for each UCA. Four potential flaws
in the feedback control loop are systematically analyzed for each UCA by exploring reasons why
(1) the controller would make an unsafe decision, (2) feedback would be inadequate, (3) the
controlled process would not receive the command, or (4) the controlled process behavior would
be unsafe despite receiving the command. Interactions between these elements of the feedback
control loop and other control entities in the control structure are considered. The following are
examples of each of these instances for UCA-1 in Table 2: Operator does not provide flight
control inputs when needed during high power maneuvers (e.g., takeoff, landing, hover,
formation flight, …). Many more scenarios can be systematically created for this UCA using this
method. Traceability is provided back to the UCA for each scenario.
Causal Scenario CS-1: The Operator has adequate feedback that a high-power maneuver
is needed. However, confusion regarding the current operational mode of the Aircraft Software
Enabled Controller (ASEC) leads the Operator to believe no inputs are necessary and that the
ASEC will accomplish the behavior. This mode-confusion may result from maintenance
personnel uploading new firmware into the vehicle that alters the modes or a remote operator
performing teaming with the RWA and changes the mode remotely to manual flight. [UCA-1]
Causal Scenario CS-2: The Operator does not have adequate feedback that a high-power
maneuver is needed. The aircraft is being operated in a degraded visual environment (DVE)
enabled by an onboard sensor suite. However, the operator interface is devoted to a separate high
workload mission operation, such as teaming with multiple UAS, and does not alert the Operator
with sufficient time. [UCA-1]
Causal Scenario CS-3: The Operator does provide flight control inputs when needed for a
high-power maneuver. However, the aircraft is being operated remotely, and insufficient
communication bandwidth, potentially due to degraded channel capacity, is available to send the
command. Or alternatively, the remote Operator inadvertently sends the command to a different
aircraft. [UCA-1]
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Causal Scenario CS-4: The ASEC does receive the flight control inputs from the
Operator. However, the ASEC detects a different potential trajectory constraint, such as another
aircraft, that could violate minimum separation standards. The ASEC overrules the Operator's
control inputs, and the command is not issued to the aircraft’s power and flight control system.
Note that the other aircraft's detection may be caused by a malicious actor spoofing a transponder
signal at a given location without a physical aircraft being there. [UCA-1]
Design Requirements
After scenarios have been identified, design requirements can then be generated to
prevent those scenarios or UCAs from occurring or to mitigate their impact should they occur.
For example, CS-1 may lead to the following design requirements. (R-1) The ASEC must inform
the Operator about its control mode [CS-1]. (R-2) The ASEC must inform the Operator of any
changes in control mode, actions taken by the ASEC as a result of that change, and the reason for
the change [CS-1]. (R-3) The ASEC must be programmed with software consistent with operator
tactics techniques and procedures [CS-1]. (R-4) Remote operators must not override onboard
operators when they are actively controlling or supervising the aircraft.
The process described in the previous section provides end-to-end traceability between
design requirements, scenarios, and back up to the unacceptable losses that should be prevented.
The traceability provides an opportunity to document the rationale for each design requirement.
The high-level abstraction of the presented analysis leads to the systematic development of highlevel requirements in the early development stages. The early insight provides a new and unique
opportunity to highlight the design trade-offs. As assessed through the analysis, features with
significant risk may be candidates for removal from the architecture. The process can then be
iterated by adding refinement in the design's details so that additional requirements can be
uncovered. In addition to iterating with STPA, R-1 and R-2 might benefit from a more specific
application of related human factors research in presenting critical information to operators at the
right time using the Alerting and Reasoning Management System (ALARMS) framework
(Saffell et al., 2011). Additional details to R-3 and R-4 would benefit from the lessons learned
through DARPA's Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS) program, as it works
with Sikorsky to explore communication protocols between autonomously operated helicopters.
Conclusions
Future RWA will be increasingly complex and will challenge the traditional delineation
between software and human controllers' responsibilities. This complexity creates new hazards
that need to be identified and addressed early in design. Traditional hazard analysis methods are
not capable of addressing complex systems with human interactions such as future RWA.
However, STPA is well suited for this problem and is applied in this paper to demonstrate
systematic identification of a subset of potential causal loss scenarios that emphasize human
factors design elements. System requirements are then derived from the causal loss scenarios to
design controls into the system to mitigate those scenarios and enforce safety. The process can be
repeated for all control actions identified in the control structure to derive a rich set of safety
requirements at this level of abstraction. As design decisions are made throughout the
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engineering lifecycle, additional detail can be incorporated into the model as refinement. The
analysis can then be continued at that level to generate lower-level system requirements.
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